On October 15th, Jakob Hensing, a current Research Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, held a conference titled "Risky Business: Transatlantic Relations in a World of Weaponized Independence" at the UC Berkeley Institute of European Studies (IES). Hensing holds a DPhil in Politics and an MPhil in International Relations from Oxford University. In his current research at the GPPi, Hensing explores how power and security considerations are reshaping the global economy in terms of competition and collaboration around emerging technologies. Professor Hensing’s presentation was intimate and seminar-style, with attendees seated around a conference table as the professor delivered his presentation. This discussion was dynamic, with participants actively taking notes and posing questions on EU-US cooperation, Germany’s strategic vulnerability, and the implications of Trump-era shifts in transatlantic relations.
In sum, Professor Hensing’s presentation reassessed the idea of interdependence. According to him, while the idea of global interdependence still holds in some respects, it does not mean that relations are free of conflict or contestation. In fact, he argued that interdependence itself can become a tool of pressure, coercion, or strategic vulnerability. A major driver for this change, according to Hensing, is the rapid transformation of technology ecosystems: from semiconductors to AI, networks, and cloud infrastructure. This means that interdependence is no longer just about trade in goods but about flows of technology, data, infrastructure and the control embedded in them.
In this regard, Hensing introduced the EU Economic Security Strategy, which provides a framework for supply-chain resilience, tech-security, managing dependencies, and economic coercion. But real progress to date has been pretty limited. The EU's key focus areas include: resilience of critical infrastructure, technology security, and anti-coercion instruments. On top of this, the idea of “managing interdependence” and "strategic indispensability” is gaining traction as a long-term project. Much of the de-risking has focused on China, with political and tech linkages making this a complex issue.
At the same time, Hensing acknowledged how the return of Donald Trump (and US policy under “America First”) changed the equation for Europe. Key shifts include more aggressive linking of technology, trade and hard security, greeted uncertainty about US commitment, less political bandwidth in Europe to address China when US focus is unsettled. What results from this is Europe facing a dual de-risking challenge: 1) continue improving its position vis-à-vis China, 2) mobilise resources to defend/secure European tech/economic infrastructure in the face of US/China competition and uncertainties. Interestingly enough, Hensing argued for the recognition of no other serious alternative to today’s US/Chinese dominance, which means that how and under what conditions Europe engages matter greatly.