On April 9th, Professor Sean Gailmard, Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy, delivered the annual Robert Kirk Underhill Lecture. Sponsored by the Anglo-American Studies Program, Center for British Studies, Institute of Government Studies, Political Science Department, and the Goldman School of Public Policy. Speaking to an audience of about twenty students and faculty, Gailmard explored how English imperialism in the Americas shaped the foundational institutions of the United States, emphasizing the Crown’s strategies for managing colonial agents and the lasting impact of those governance structures. The lecture concluded with a lively Q&A session on the implications of these imperial legacies for modern American politics.
Gailmard opened by asking: Why are American institutions so resistant to change? He argued that core features of US governance—federalism, separation of powers, or district-based elections—are legacies of English colonial administration. Challenging prevailing narratives that portray colonial institutions as top-down creations, Gailmard highlighted the principal-agent problems the Crown faced in managing distant colonies.
He introduced the concept of contractual imperialism, describing the relationship between the Crown and its colonists as governed by formal agreements, such as charters, which were enforceable in the English courts. These documents delegated authority and outlined oversight mechanisms. Yet, due to the geographic distance and resulting information asymmetries, enforcing imperial interests—especially in finance and security—proved challenging.
Gailmard explored how these contracts inadvertently granted colonial governments considerable autonomy. As long as colonists adhered to legal frameworks, they maintained long-term control over internal economic affairs with minimal interference. In return, output-sharing arrangements—such as copper shares or custom duties—aligned with the Crown’s economic goals, while foreign policy remained tightly monitored, particularly after prolonged European conflicts.
Addressing why American institutions diverged from those in other former English colonies, Gailmard dismissed explanations rooted in environmental differences, such as climate or disease. He compared Massachusetts and Barbados, noting that despite vastly different conditions, both operated under similar institutional contracts. Unlike other empires focused solely on extraction, English colonies were structured around self-governing legislatures, encouraging settlers to invest, stay, and manage their own affairs.
Gailmard drew clear parallels between colonial governance and modern U.S. institutions. Federalism and the separation of powers stem from the existence of independent colonial legislatures and governors. Judicial review reflects colonial practices of legislative oversight by an independent judiciary. Even the early mutual independence of colonies foreshadowed the U.S. state's role as political units, leading to enduring structures like Senate malapportionment.
He concluded that while the autonomy granted through contractual imperialism was efficient in uncertain conditions, it ultimately empowered colonial elites in ways the Crown could not reverse. Over time, these arrangements served colonial merchant classes more than imperial interests—an unintended but lasting outcome.
In the Q&A, Gailmard addressed the role of religion in English colonial governance, contrasting it with the more overt religious control of French and Spanish empires. For example, Puritans in Massachusetts sought England’s recognition while safeguarding their religious practices. Further questions explored the rationale behind the Crown’s support for independent legislatures and how oversight evolved across different colonies, such as Georgia.
Gailmard’s lecture provided a compelling lens through which to view the formation of American political institutions—not as purely democratic innovations, but as the product of imperial strategies balancing autonomy and control. Rather than viewing the endurance of these institutions as a failure to evolve, he framed them as enduring results of England’s pragmatic and contract-based approach to colonial governance.