On April 22nd, the Institute of European Studies (IES) and the Institute for Governmental Studies (IGS) at UC Berkeley co-hosted a lecture by Sergio Fabbrini, Professor Emeritus of Politics and International Relations at Luiss University in Rome and a longtime visiting scholar at IGS. Fabbrini presented insights from his latest book, A Federalist Alternative for European Governance: The European Union in Hard Times, to an engaged audience of 15 participants.
Fabbrini opened by outlining the book’s core aim: to make sense of the European Union’s trajectory over the past fifteen years. He revealed that while he originally preferred the title The European Union in Hard Times, his publisher prioritized the phrase A Federalist Alternative. Nonetheless, the backdrop of ongoing and recent crises within the EU—ranging from financial turmoil to migration and geopolitical instability—serves as the analytical foundation for the book’s central inquiry. Although completed prior to the second election of Donald Trump, the book incorporates major political developments within the EU up to that point.
The lecture focused on Fabbrini’s examination of the EU’s institutional responses to the crises of the 2010s and 2020s. His analysis highlighted the predominance of national governments over supranational bodies like the European Commission, characterizing the EU's actions as reactive rather than proactive. In his view, this trend suggests a shift toward an intergovernmental structure increasingly centered on the European Council. He traced this shift back to the post-Maastricht divide between supranational economic governance and intergovernmental decision-making on issues of sovereignty—a dynamic that has increasingly consolidated power within the Council of Ministers and the European Council.
Fabbrini introduced the concept of a “dual governance regime” to describe the bifurcated structure of EU governance, with the European Commission focusing on regulation and the European Council handling strategic direction. He argued that this division has resulted in institutional ambiguity and a lack of accountability. While some member states, such as France, continue to defend the principle of unanimity in EU governance, broader policy coherence across the Union appears to be unraveling.
In proposing his “federalist alternative,” Fabbrini distinguished between federations formed through disaggregation (e.g., postwar Germany, Canada, Australia) and those formed through aggregation (e.g., the United States). He advocated for an aggregative model of European federalism—but one distinct from the American compound democracy. Instead, he envisioned a multi-tiered European Union with a politically and militarily capable federal core, while allowing member states to retain limited sovereignty. For this vision to materialize, Fabbrini stressed the importance of developing a pragmatic, empirical model that accounts for Europe’s cultural diversity—rather than relying on the current legalistic approach. He also pointed to political resistance from leaders such as Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, whom he described as rooted in a tradition of national sovereignty that sees the EU primarily as a “service agency.”
The lecture concluded with a dynamic Q&A session, in which Fabbrini addressed a wide array of topics including constitutional law, multilingualism, and the divergent historical paths of German and French state formation. He reiterated the urgent need for collective European investment in a common defense policy, particularly in light of shifting political landscapes in the United States.