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A draft on  
**European security and the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**  
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Studies on international regionalism emphasized commonality as the condition for cooperation and integration. Culture and value commonality is essential to adopt norms of conflict management/resolution and introduce institutions of political interdependence while no commonality means instability, conflict and lack of any cooperation and integration relationship. This traditional approach to regionalism is confronted with recent analyses focused on social and institutional construction of international regions regardless of shared attributes by the member states. These analyses put the origin of cooperation/integration between the countries of a region in the perception of shared problems and dialogue intensification among the region countries.

The argument is: regional integration occurs in geographical groups of countries because, among other reasons, they share sensitivity to some problems caused to them by some global trends and recognize that negotiations aimed at coordinating their reactions to these problems is the appropriate tool for coping with the problems. Each government realizes that his state is upset by problems whose origin, development and solution exceed the national borders. This fact is true in as different fields as environment for the problem of pollution, demography for the problem of migration, health for the problem of epidemics, and public security for the problem of organized crime and illegal trade. Because of the interconnection of contemporary societies and states, governments are unable to provide people with personal security, societies with stable economic growth and groups with social protection unless they turn to coordination and cooperation with the governments of the neighboring countries. One country's action and inaction with regard to a trans-national problem directly affects the neighboring countries. Inaction causes dropping of a problem into the territory of the neighbors, when this problem is not there, or aggravating the situation, when it is

already there. Also the decision to adopt an action divergent from the neighbor's action towards the same problem, aggravates the problem suffered by the two states. Admittedly, this argument does not take into account the phenomenon of false and failed states. The propositions on global problems and state cooperation do not apply to this kind of states. These states pose serious problems to current world affairs but their existence does not affect this evolutionary trend of world politics.

Problems caused by interconnection can be taken under control only by coordinating policies, strategies and regulations of the national level with policies, strategies and regulations issued at the international level. For this reason, these problems must be put on the agenda of the global system and/or international regions. To put a problem on the agenda means targeting the problem with international law rules and/or programs and actions of the competent institution(s) of the global and regional systems. When such institutions do not exist, their creation is stimulated by the problem. The EU, ASEAN, APEC, NAFTA and MERCOSUR are examples of attempts of different kinds to build regional institutions to face the challenges of global trends using various means of coordination and action at the level of the region.

In such a perspective, region analysts are invited to turn their attention also to regions, like the Euro-Mediterranean region, which surround mid-land seas and include states belonging to different regional systems. Mediterranean regions have been ignored by region analysts as regions of cooperation because of low frequency of relations between countries and lack of common values/identity within the group of people. These facts notwithstanding, interactions are increasing in number and cooperation projects have been put in place also between countries of regions, like the Euro-Mediterranean region, with no strong common attributes. This fact signals that the governments of these regions perceive the need to cooperate and, to a certain extent, integrate. The (functional) cooperation imperative pertains also to countries of mediterranean regions despite the fact that they have no tradition of making collective decisions to face common problems. In this perspective, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a region institution-building process to set appropriate means of reaction to global trends and settle the specific aspects of these problems in the region.

The present paper analyses Euro-Mediterranean cooperation within the perspective of international political regionalism and, in particular, deals with

partnership building and security issues. In the first section, the concept of *regional security partnership* is defined. In the second section, the security arrangement of Europe as regional security partnership is placed in the wider context of the change of security cooperation in the world system. Last section deals with the broad concept of *partnership-building process* (PBP) in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

### Regional security partnership

The study of regional security arrangements must be taken into consideration by EMP analysts because current changes in security cooperation have great impact on the structures and doctrines of national defense as well as on regional political arrangements. This has been true for Europe for the last thirty years and is becoming increasingly important for Asia. The present analysis relies on knowledge elaborated by regional security studies<sup>1</sup> and brings into the framework of security studies the concept of regional security partnership as the appropriate analytical tool for understanding the nature of regional security arrangements in the contemporary world.

A *regional security partnership* is the security arrangement of an international region which originates from the consensus of the states to cooperate on the stability and peace of the region using different types of agreements such as formal security treaties and international organizations, joint action agreements, multilateral processes (like the CSCE/OSCE), peace and stability pacts which include confidence-building measures and similar tools. A regional security partnership includes all the countries of a region and also out-of-region powers.

The construction of the European security system, which started with the 1972 convention of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is the first example of regional security partnership building in international politics. The peculiarities of the European international politics of the bipolar and post-bipolar eras and the presence of both the EC/EU integration process and the CSCE/OSCE security-building process are invoked as the reasons for the creation of the security system of

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<sup>1</sup> The study of security regionalism divides in different schools including the security community constructivist school (see Adler, 1998; Adler and Barnett, 1998), the security culture school (Krause, 1999), the school of regional security complexes (Buzan, 1991), the school of the zones of peace and war (Singer and Widlavsky, 1993) and the school of the socio-economic complexes (Solingen, 1998).

Europe. The distinctiveness of Europe and European politics, however, is not enough to support the thesis that the European regional security partnership model is unique and will remain isolated. Concern for security issues associated with the interdependence that develops among the countries of other regions of the world, such as the Asia-Pacific, Central Asia and the Mediterranean, points to the opposite. Three major instances of regional security partnership building, in addition to the European one, are counted today. They are:

- the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), also known as the Shanghai Five initiative, in Central Asia. "Shanghai Five" originated from the summit meeting of five states (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) held in Shanghai in April 1996. Since the first summit meeting, a series of agreements among the five states have been concluded and practical measures have been adopted and implemented to construct security partnership. The Agreement on Confidence-Building in the military Field Along the Border Areas and the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas, signed in 1996 and 1997 respectively, were the most important agreements to implement security partnership building among the five countries. Practical measures to crack down on international terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal immigration and other forms of cross-border crimes have been included in the security partnership building measures. The "Shanghai Five" mechanism was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 15, 2001. After Uzbekistan's admission, the SCO counts on six member states today. According to the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the SCO has characterized its aims as strengthening mutual trust among member states and their effective cooperation in various fields (see Attinà and Zhu, 2001);
- the Asian Regional Forum, also known as ARF, in the Asia-Pacific region. ARF objectives, outlined in the First ARF Chairman's Statement in 1994, are to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern, and make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-

Pacific region. Its membership has increased from initial 18 to 23 countries (see Attinà and Zhu, 2001; and Kivimaki, 2001);

- the Euro-Mediterranean project which is confronted with the derailment of the Middle East Peace Process (see Attinà and Stavridis, 2001). However, in the Action Plan approved at the Valencia Foreign Ministers Conference (22-23 April 1992), it is confirmed “*the mandate of the Senior Officials on the Draft Charter for Peace and Stability to continue their work as appropriate so as to enable the Charter to be adopted as soon as the political situation allows*”.

The building of regional security partnerships is a process unique to contemporary international relations. It differs from the traditional form of security cooperation, i.e. military alliances, and the specific form defined by political scientists as security community.

A military alliance is based on the traditional conception of state security as the condition reached by a group of states when their military forces are coordinated to threaten the use of force in order to dissuade potential aggressors. The building of regional security partnership arrangements, instead, is based on the conception of security developed in Europe during the Helsinki Process. According to this view, both international and internal measures are put in place to improve the security conditions of the region and defend geopolitical stability. The dissuasion of aggressor states and avoidance of international violence in a region are believed to be at hand when the security system includes all or almost all of the states of the region and extra-region powers rather than when national armed forces are pooled in opposing military alliances and alignments.

Security partnerships are different also from security communities. In Deutsch’s terms, a security community is “a group of people which has become integrated” (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5) and, therefore, constitutes a group of countries among whom war is obsolete as an instrument of conflict resolution. A security community is brought into being by high levels of transaction and communication flows which bind a group of people together and enable them to think of themselves as a community, thus producing favorable conditions for the establishment of institutions of peaceful conflict resolution. Security partnership agreements, in contrast, are formed within groups of countries

characterized by conflict division and limited exchange of transactions and communication but disposed to manage their conflict divisions by taking steps towards reducing the risk of violent confrontation and allowing the flow of communication and transactions to increase. It is possible that as much as a security partnership becomes stronger and durable over time, it develops into a security community, but no evidence of such a change is available today.

A security partnership arrangement is based on a set of documents which include one or more fundamental agreements and a number of related operative agreements. In the fundamental agreement - for example, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe; the 1995 Barcelona Declaration on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; the June 2001 Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and the 1994 Chairman's Statement at the First ASEAN Regional Forum - shared principles of peaceful relations are proclaimed and sources of conflict, tension and instability are made public. In the latter, measures directed toward managing both international and internal problems are arranged by governments and international organizations of the region in order to prevent the risk of conflict and violence that can break down the stability of the region. The fundamental agreements are the initial step of partnership building, but a regional security partnership comes in use when operative agreements and mechanisms are established.

The list of means to strengthen international security in a region includes

1. measures based on the commitment of the states to provide resources for collective security,
2. rapid intervention forces to interrupt military conflicts and deter aggressive actions,
3. military and civilian crisis management capabilities to restore peaceful relations.

The means to strengthen internal security conditions include

1. political assistance to improve internal democracy to constrain the aggressive aspirations of leaders and social groups by the values and procedures of democracy;

2. measures of economic aid to the countries in need and policies of economic integration among the countries of the region in order to ease inter-state tensions with collective economic welfare;
3. programs for developing domestic civil societies and building relations among national civil societies in order to ease tensions by promoting social pluralism and creating mutual understanding among the countries of the region with the promotion of trans-national social relations.

Although international organizations are the most important collective actors of security partnership agreements, especially in as much as they are responsible for peace-keeping operations, military alliances and ad hoc security agreements among the countries of the region (like the ESDP) also have important functions in the regional arrangement of security. Both international organizations and military coordination agreements have the effect of defense de-nationalization as much as they create organized structures of common defense and multilateral forces of intervention (Zang and Zurn, 1999).

The building of a regional security partnership is not an accident in the history of Europe but the result of the transformation of security coordination which has been developing along with the evolution of world politics. The next section analyzes the recent evolution of security cooperation in the world and in Europe. The section places the European security system within the context of the evolution of multilateral security and defense coordination at the global and regional level. The analysis is based on data on military alliances recorded at the University of Catania for the research project on “Evolution of security in world politics”<sup>2</sup>.

### Regional security cooperation: the world and European trend in defense pacts

For the past two centuries, military pacts and security alliances have been the most common form of coordination of strategic efforts and aggregation of military power used by states to cope with threats to national security. Over the long term,

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<sup>2</sup> The project data set – which contains information on the type, duration and members of the military alliances from 1815 to 1999 – has been made possible from receiving the COW data set on military alliances 1815-1992 of the University of Michigan as updated to 1995 at the MIT by Bruce Russett and John O’Neal. Carla Monteleone made the final updating of the data up to the 1999 year term (See also Attinà 2001).

however, the preference of states for military alliances is not constant. It changes in relation to system pressures, such as the great power competition/system polarization and the security culture predominant in single international systems (see Attinà, forthcoming). Great power competition influences the military cooperation of states because security alliances are promoted by the great powers, either to consolidate or change and subvert an existing political order. The security culture influences security cooperation among states because values and norms about security, stability and peace shared by the majority of the political élites of the world determine the preference of national governments for certain forms of military cooperation over others. Therefore, the analysis of security cooperation over the short term must take into account the state of global power competition and polarization and the predominant security culture of the system under analysis. Also the study of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership must take these system factors into account as they influence the decision of the Euro-Mediterranean governments to achieve stronger security cooperation.

In contemporary world politics, the preference for defense pacts (DP) has not been constant over time (see Figure no. 1 and data in Appendix A). Defense pacts are military agreements among governments that pledge to coordinate their defense systems and define some forms of aggregation of their military forces<sup>3</sup>. The number of defense pacts sharply increased in the aftermath of World War II because of the polarization of the system, but it decreased ten years later when a growing number of states reacted to the great power pressure for security alignment. In the following years, the number of defense pacts gradually increased, although the level continues to be lower than in the time of the Cold War.

The number of defense pacts, however, does not accurately reflect state preferences for military coordination. More relevant information is provided by two indexes of state aggregation in defense pacts: the DP intensity and DP magnitude indexes. The former is the percentage of defense pact members in relation to the total number of states in the international or single regional system. It gives an indication of

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<sup>3</sup> In the data set on military alliances, Defense Pacts are defined as *the agreements by which the signatories obligate themselves to intervene militarily on behalf of one another if either of them were attacked*. Two different types of security alliance are neutrality pacts (agreements by which the signatories commit to remain militarily neutral if the partner were attacked) and *ententes* (agreements by which the signatories commit to consult with, or cooperate, in a given military contingency).

how popular defense pact coordination is in these systems. The latter is the mean size of defense pacts in terms of the number of member states. It shows the preferred size of coordination (i.e. small and large alliances) and indicates the dominant security culture of different periods of world history (i.e. multilateralism and collective security vs. small coalitions consonant with the self-help defense principle of the system of states).

The intensity of defense aggregation has been decreasing quite steadily for the last thirty-five years, signaling both the de-polarization of the system and the increase of preference for self-help and/or reliance upon other means and institutions rather than defense pacts as the foundation of state security in the mind of the policy-makers.

At the same time, the magnitude of defense pacts doubled after 1955 - i.e. after the end of the most intense period of the Cold War - and did not change much over the following years, signaling the continuing preference for large defense aggregation by the governments of the countries which adopt defense coordination as their preferred means of state security.

Figure no. 1 here

The retreat from security coordination in the form of defense pacts is apparent also in Europe (see Figure no. 2 and Appendix B for data). However, while the change of the number of defense pacts in the region largely conforms to the trend in the world system over the long term, no major changes have taken place in the last twenty or thirty years in Europe but in the rest of the world. Indeed, polarity has been stable in Europe and depolarization did not produce the decrease of defense aggregation as it did in the rest of the world. The decline of the intensity index began in the early 1960s in the international system as a whole. In Europe, exit from defense coordination was not an option for alliance partners. But, with the end of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, defense pact aggregation intensity decreased abruptly. Concerning the size of defense pacts, a rather stable feature of security coordination in contemporary world politics, the magnitude of European defense pacts has been larger than that of the world system since the end of the *real* Cold War, i.e. since 1955.

Figure no.2 here

This analysis of security cooperation in Europe can be complemented with further data and facts like those on arms control negotiations and the CSCE/OSCE security practice<sup>4</sup>. The overall argument of the present analysis is that current regional security practice is part of a process of change in international security practices. It can be conceptually defined as the *supplement hypothesis* (and even, *substitution hypothesis*) argument. According to it, regional agreements of security partnership will supplement military alliances and defense pacts in providing security to states and even remove from military alliances the role of the alone structure of coordination for the security of states. Practices and instruments of security have been changing over time. New ones have been invented, experimented and gradually transposed into security measures among states and added to instruments and practices already in use. State security is a stake achieved by adopting more than one means among those available. Different means are adopted according to system conditions, that is to great power competition and security culture. Defense pacts, defense organizations (like NATO and the ESDP) and regional security partnerships are forms of security cooperation which do not exclude each other but are related to one another.

Defense pacts by non-European countries of the Mediterranean region are not comparable to the defense pacts of European states (See Appendix C). At the exception of the League of Arab States, which is a defense pact only by name, and the Egypt-Jordan defense pact, all the four pacts made by EMP countries in the past disappeared in the Fifties. Also a number of *ententes* were made by Med-countries and no neutrality pact. The difference between European and non-European EMP's countries in defense cooperation can be a matter of security culture.

The security culture of contemporary European countries was forged in the bipolar context of the nuclear deterrence strategy and the multilateral context of the Helsinki Process. The former strengthened their inclination towards the system of opposed military alliances while the latter made them responsive to new views of regional security arrangement and prevailed when the Cold war was over.

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<sup>4</sup> The literature on the European security system is vast and rich in information relevant to these aspects. See especially the most recent analyses of Aggestam and Hyde-Price (2001) and Flynn and Farrell (1999).

Also the origin of the security culture of the Middle East and North Africa Arab states is in the Cold War practices of the superpowers which influenced the consolidation of post-colonial states, the adversarial nature of regional politics and the militarisation of domestic regimes. However, the Arabs opposed the Cold War model of regional politics with the project of an Arab trans-state community inclusive of all the Arab populations. Lack of consideration for domestic variables (like regime stability, national cohesion and economic performance) and underestimation of inter-Arab state conflicts were features of this approach as it was the lack of concrete steps towards mutual confidence in security matters.

### EMP and Partnership-Building

Generally speaking, partnership-building measures (PBMs) are measures for promoting regular consultations and exchanges of information aimed at strengthening the political and security-related dialogue between partners. Here it is maintained that the comprehensive term partnership-building *process* (PBP) can be used aside from the specific term partnership-building *measures* targeted only on security and defense matters.

Partnership is not a new term in the vocabulary of world politics. It is commonly used to name a form of wished-for relations rather than an actual form of relationship. The Euro-Atlantic discourse made use of this term when the Atlantic Alliance was in troubled waters and looking for a new start of cooperation. In fact, in the vocabulary of world politics, the common meaning of the term - i.e. joint participation of two or more subjects in the same activity – is enriched with the connotation that emphasizes respect for the parity of the subjects taking part in the planned activities. By all means, this is also the case with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. EU countries want to reassure the non-EU partners on their respect for the equal sovereignty of all the participating countries while Mediterranean Partners want to make clear that this condition is the *sine qua non* of their participation in the initiative. Actually, this condition underlines the fact that the Barcelona Process is at risk because of the great differences existing among the partners.

This fact notwithstanding, the chance of partnership-building in the Mediterranean can be kept alive in the same way as the chance of union-building of the

European countries is kept alive against enduring and recurrent obstacles. In the European integration process, union has never been considered as an immediately attainable project, but as a long-term objective to be reached by the flexible implementation of various integration programs.

In harmony with the European integration process, also the partnership-building process in the Mediterranean must be arranged so that it can adapt to the many obstacles it faces, and make stock of past experience in overcoming obstacles and reinforce the process. The chosen objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean process are an area of peace and stability, shared prosperity, dialogue between cultures and encounter of different societies. The means to achieve these objectives are, at the present date, above all free trade, transfer of financial resources from Europe to the Mediterranean Partners, transfer of knowledge in both directions but mostly from Europe to North African countries in the economic chapter, dialogue in the cultural and social chapter, and exchange of views and reciprocal pledges of self-restraint on security issues. The process to achieve the partnership-building objective with these means must appropriately be developed, i.e. it must be progressive, flexible and variable.

The *progressive* nature of the PBP is dependent on an appropriate priority strategy. A few sectors of great relevance and small complexity must be recognized as objectives of the earliest stage of the cooperation process. More complex sectors must be left to later stages. A progressive PBP is a cumulative and expansive process which benefits from, and also waits for, some spill-over effects of the results of the first stage programs. This can be applied to the three chapters of the Barcelona Process as progress in a chapter spills-over to the others. Up to the present, a progressive strategy has not been explicitly defined for the Barcelona Process, although some priorities have been applied as, for example, in the Political and Security Chapter with information exchange mechanisms (like the EuroMeSCo network); in the Economic and Financial Chapter with the definition of rules of origins and the promotion of private investment; and in the Social, Cultural and Human Affairs Chapter with projects on the cultural heritage and media-visual projects.

A *flexible* PBP is a process which allows temporary exceptions and delays to the partners who are not ready to follow the speed of the majority but recognize the importance of the cooperation programs for all the Partnership members and pledge to

accede to the programs as soon as they are able to. A flexible strategy implies also taking into account the capability of all the members to adapt to the goals and standards of the Partnership and change their internal structure at different speeds. In the Barcelona Process, the flexible strategy is imperfectly practiced in the Economic and Financial Chapter through the Association Agreements. This instrument was invented before the Process was launched and should be used only as a special instrument. The Association Agreements are bilateral agreements between the single Mediterranean Partner and the EU and member states. Therefore, it seems not congenial to the multilateral nature of the Process even though the different conditions of the markets and economies of the Mediterranean Partners explain the use of this instrument. With regard to the bilateral strategy of the relations between the European Union and the partners, the Association Agreements are comparable to the European Agreements signed by the EU and applicant countries in Eastern and Central Europe. As the philosophy of differentiation of the enlargement process has been reviewed and officially abandoned, a critical review of the bilateral strategy of the Association Agreements will be useful also to the EMP. A change of this strategy will be easier to the extent that North-African regional cooperation projects improves their conditions.

The prospects for sub-regional cooperation projects (as, for example, the Arab Maghreb Union and security mechanisms in the Western Mediterranean) are topics of great consideration. These projects concern the third attribute of the proposed PBP strategy. A *variable* process allows small groups of countries to go forward with some cooperation programs, provided that these programs do not harm the development of the Partnership. EU countries are accustomed to differentiated integration as, for example, the Social Charter, the EMU and the different position of the member countries in the newly born Common European Security and Defense Policy. As it is known, the norms of the Treaty of European Union regulate the possibility of carrying out reinforced or closer cooperation among a small number of EU member countries. In fact, variable integration/partnership can be a safety valve against the tensions that exists among countries with different preferences. The Mediterranean PBP must take this valve into appropriate consideration and make a general agreement on how sub-group accords can be made without prejudice for the regional partnership.

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## Appendix A

Year	No. of states in the international system	No. of states in defense pacts	No. of Defense pacts	Defence pact Intensity	Defence pact Magnitude	No. of states in Europe	No. of European states in European DP	No. of Defense pacts in Europe	Defence pact Intensity in Europe	Defence pact Magnitude in Europe
1945	68	11	9	16,2	2,0	26	4	3	15,4	2,0
1946	72	13	13	18,1	2,0	25	5	6	20,0	2,0
1947	75	37	18	49,3	3,1	25	10	12	40,0	2,0
1948	75	40	22	53,3	2,8	25	13	16	52,0	2,2
1949	76	45	22	59,2	2,3	25	18	18	72,0	2,6
1950	77	50	25	64,9	3,4	25	18	18	72,0	2,6
1951	79	50	24	63,3	3,5	25	18	18	72,0	2,6
1952	82	50	24	61,0	3,6	25	20	18	80,0	2,7
1953	84	53	25	63,1	3,6	25	20	18	80,0	2,7
1954	87	54	25	62,1	3,6	26	21	18	80,8	2,7
1955	89	54	10	60,7	6,5	28	22	3	78,6	8,3
1956	90	57	9	63,3	6,5	28	22	3	78,6	8,3
1957	89	59	9	66,3	7,3	28	22	3	78,6	8,3
1958	107	60	9	56,1	7,4	28	22	3	78,6	8,3
1959	111	60	9	54,1	7,4	28	22	3	78,6	8,3
1960	117	58	9	49,6	7,2	29	22	3	75,9	8,3
1961	119	75	12	63,0	6,9	29	22	3	75,9	8,3
1962	122	76	12	62,3	7,0	29	22	3	75,9	8,3
1963	125	77	12	61,6	7,2	29	22	3	75,9	8,3
1964	129	65	11	50,4	6,6	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1965	130	67	12	51,5	6,1	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1966	133	67	12	50,4	6,2	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1967	133	65	12	48,9	6,1	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1968	134	64	12	47,8	6,0	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1969	139	64	12	46,0	6,0	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1970	140	64	12	45,7	6,0	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1971	141	66	11	46,8	6,6	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1972	143	67	12	46,9	6,3	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1973	150	67	12	44,7	6,3	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1974	151	69	13	45,7	6,0	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1975	152	69	13	45,4	6,0	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1976	154	70	14	45,5	5,7	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1977	156	80	15	51,3	5,5	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1978	156	71	15	45,5	5,5	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1979	159	70	15	44,0	5,5	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1980	159	71	16	44,7	5,3	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1981	160	71	16	44,4	5,3	30	21	3	70,0	8,0
1982	161	73	16	45,3	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1983	161	73	16	45,3	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1984	161	74	16	46,0	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1985	161	74	16	46,0	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1986	161	74	16	46,0	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1987	161	74	16	46,0	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1988	165	74	16	44,8	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3

1989	177	74	16	41,8	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1990	181	74	16	40,9	5,4	30	22	3	73,3	8,3
1991	186	67	15	36,0	5,3	44	16	2	36,3	9,0
1992	187	65	14	34,8	5,5	48	14	1	29,1	16,0
1993	187	68	15	36,4	5,3	53	16	2	30,2	9,0
1994	187	69	16	36,9	5,1	53	17	3	32,0	6,7
1995	187	69	15	36,9	5,3	53	17	3	32,0	6,7
1996	187	70	16	37,4	5,1	53	17	3	32,0	6,7
1997	187	70	16	37,4	5,1	53	17	3	32,0	6,7
1998	187	72	18	38,5	4,7	53	17	4	32,0	5,5
1999	187	72	18	38,5	4,9	53	20	4	37,8	5,5


**Appendix B**  
**Defense pacts in Europe, 1945-1999**

Member States	Year of start	Year of end
Czechoslovakia, Russia (USSR)	1945	1955
Poland, Russia (USSR)	1945	1955
Yugoslavia/Serbia, Russia (USSR)	1945	1948
Albania, Yugoslavia/Serbia	1946	1948
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia/Serbia	1946	1948
Poland, Yugoslavia/Serbia	1946	1948
Yugoslavia/Serbia, Rumania	1947	1948
Hungary, Yugoslavia/Serbia	1947	1948
Yugoslavia/Serbia, Bulgaria	1947	1948
United Kingdom, France	1947	1949
Albania, Bulgaria	1947	1955
Poland, Czechoslovakia	1947	1955
Russia (USSR), Finland	1948	1992
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France	1948	1949
Hungary, Bulgaria	1948	1955
Poland, Hungary	1948	1955
Poland, Bulgaria	1948	1955
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria	1948	1955
Bulgaria, Russia (USSR)	1948	1955
Rumania, Russia (USSR)	1948	1955
Hungary, Russia (USSR)	1948	1955
Bulgaria, Rumania	1948	1955
Hungary, Rumania	1948	1955
Hungary, Czechoslovakia	1949	1955
Czechoslovakia, Rumania	1949	1955
Poland, Rumania	1949	1955
United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Spain (5.1982), Portugal, German Federal Republic (5.1954), Italy, Greece (2.1952), Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Turkey (2.1952), Czech Republic (4.1999), Poland (4.1999), Hungary (4.1999)	1949	-
Yugoslavia/Serbia, Greece, Turkey	1954	1954
German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania (5.1955-12.1968), Bulgaria, Rumania, Russia (USSR)	1955	1991
Russia, Tajikistan	1993	-
Azerbaijan, Turkey	1994	-
Russia, Azerbaijan	1998	-

**Appendix C**  
**Defense pacts of the EMP countries, 1945-1999**

<b>Member State</b>	<b>Year of start</b>	<b>Year of end</b>
United Kingdom, Iraq	1932	1956
United Kingdom, Egypt	1937	1951
United Kingdom, Jordan	1946	1957
Morocco (1.1958), Algeria (1.1962), Tunisia (1.1956), Libya (1.1953), Sudan (1.1956), Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen Arab Republic, Kuwait (1.1961), Syria	1950	-
Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey	1954	1954
Egypt, Jordan	1967	-

**Figure no.1: Number, intensity and magnitude of Defense Pacts in the world system, 1945-199**



**Fig. no. 2: Number, intensity and magnitude of Defense Pacts in Europe, 1945-1999**

