The First Turkish Vote on Iraq
Kerem Yilmaz, International and Area Studies student
As a country locked between two continents, Turkey has always served as a physical and cultural
bridge between societies and ideas. Today, with the world's focus on Iraq, Turkey stands locked
between two coalitions bent on disarming Iraq through war or peace respectively. On Saturday, March
1, 2003, the Turkish parliament dealt a stunning blow to United States war planning efforts by failing
to approve a bill allowing American combat troops to open a northern front against Iraq. The vote was
264-250 in favor, with 19 abstentions. Yet, the decision was three votes short of the simple majority
required by the constitution.
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Despite the enormous financial losses resulting from the first Gulf War, Turkey has remained a
steadfast American ally in sending troops to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan to work with American forces.
Individuals who were surprised by the initial resistance to the war should analyze the roots of this
reluctance. With 94 percent of the Turkish population against the war, public opinion played an important
role in decision-making. Before the vote, 50,000 Turks staged an anti-war rally near parliament chanting
"No to War." Many in government also felt embarrassed by the manner in which the American government and
media had assumed Turkish assistance was a foregone conclusion.
Although Turks despise Saddam Hussein, Washington did not realize the difficulty in persuading Turkey to
fight against another Muslim nation. Officials in Parliament were afraid of violating Article 29 of the
Turkish Constitution, which forbids taking part in a war unless it is "justified by international law."
In this lens of analysis, Iraq had not committed any violations of international law nor been an aggressor
in any conflict. Iraq had not attacked Turkey, and neither the United Nations Security Council nor NATO
had sanctioned an attack on Iraq.
Some individuals, including the American government, argue that Turkey let pass an impressive economic
aid package. To comprehend consequences of the aid package, one must understand Turkey's economic situation.
At the end of 2002, the Treasury's combined internal and external debt amounted to about $148 billion.
The guaranteed American package of $15-$30 billion in loans and grants would have brought much needed relief
to a staggering Turkish economy caught in imminent cardiac arrest.
However, Turkish officials also argue that their country lost more than $40 billion in revenue by
cooperating with the United States during the Persian Gulf War and subsequent sanctions against Iraq. In
fact, one can argue that broken American promises through blocked legislature due to intense anti-Turk
lobbying from the first Persian Gulf War, combined with the nearly 500,000 refuges migrating into Turkey
helped to create massive debt, high inflation, and decreased tourism-all leading to the financial crises of
1994 and 1999. If the first war helped create these problems, how does a second military conflict help to
pull the Turkish economy out of the doldrums? How will the United States ensure that all promises are kept
this time around?
The votes also come amid increasing tensions between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds who live in an autonomous zone
across the border. Turks and Iraqi Kurds could be key allies of the U.S. in a war to depose Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein. However, the U.S. had not guaranteed what role Turkey would have in determining a post-war
outcome in the region, nor is there an agreement over disarmament of Kurdish populations after the war. In
this current non-vote environment-should there be an independent Kurdish state-Turkey fears the flood of
refugees along with the 12 million Kurds in Turkey would begin to clamor for territorial independence to join
an independent Kurdistan.
Should Iraq disintegrate during war, Turkey has said it will unilaterally move of thousands of troops into
northern Iraq in order to prevent a flood of refugees and the creation of a Kurdish state within Turkish
sovereignty. Iraqi Kurds have threatened to resist any such Turkish incursion to the death. Especially after
the bold Human Rights reforms of August 2002, a unilateral Turkish action would create immense repercussions
for Turkey's accession to the European Union. A multilateral force with the United States would give Turkey
a presence in the region, ensure Turkish territorial integrity, and potentially protect it from perceived human
rights violations.
The Turkish military, which has intervened repeatedly in Turkish politics since the foundation of the republic,
is thought to favor the American deployment due to the Kurdish situation. One should note that the Turkish
military has been battling a war against terrorism since 1987 and the nation has lost over 30,000 Turkish to
PKK hostilities. The military currently has called for a second round of elections; should the military overtly
intrude into the affairs of government or topple the AKP, Turkey will be in strict violation of the Copenhagen
Criteria concerning democracy and the stability of institutions. An action in this manner would jeopardize any
remaining hopes of accession. With the Islamist AKP wielding majority power in government, a coup looks unlikely.
Post-vote relations with Washington may be strained as well. This vote assured the world the Turkish government
was not merely an American puppet, yet Turks and Americans have been close allies and "friends" for over fifty
years. The vote's blockage may push Turkey's sole super-power ally away from influencing affairs relating to
Turkey's IMF aid packages, the situation in Cyprus, relations with Greece, and Turkey's drive for European
Union accession.
Unlike the United States, Turkey cannot return to the comforts of North America. When the United States does
depart from the region (and they will), Turkey will be left with the consequences-good or bad. Parliament's
initial rejection of U.S. presence is not a steadfast hindrance. It is merely the Turkish government insisting
for specific assurances on a safe and secure post-war Iraq. This includes an Iraq that will remain united with
oil revenues distributed equitably amongst Iraqi citizens, an assurance of equality for all Iraqi minorities, and
guaranteed compensation for the enormous financial losses Turkey is bound to incur in a conflict.
In its own world, Turkey is like a married woman attempting to appease three husbands: the International Monetary
Fund, the European Union, and the United States. President Bush insists war with Iraq will bring democracy and
peace to the Middle East. On this particular Saturday, just for one moment, democracy worked nicely in Turkey while
some semblance of peace remained in the world. Alas, the consequences of this vote are for another day.