Why is there No Mad Cow Disease in the United States? Comparing the Politics of Food Safety

The outbreak of mad cow disease in Europe has been labeled as the worst public policy disaster since the founding of the European Community. It has hurt Europe economically and politically, and it has revealed flaws in the food safety system. Scrutinizing the crisis helps highlight the impact of government and other public institutions on the politics of food safety. Up to now mad cow disease, or BSE, has not occurred in the United States. This is partly due to the much larger soy content in animal feed compared to that in Europe, which may prevent cows from getting the disease by stabilizing their immune system. Nevertheless, American farmers have been using feed that contains animal waste for decades. It was not until 1997 that the U. S. Food and Drug Administration banned the feeding of ruminant feedstuffs back to ruminant animals. In fact this ban is not as strict as the European regulation, and the FDA has been criticized for the standards it has set. To their credit, though, agencies and their stakeholders did raise awareness on this issue at an early stage.

	Christoph Strünck explaining the politics behind the mad cow outbreak

The crisis in Europe could have been dealt with more efficiently had politics been less secretive at the beginning of the outbreak. By the time the British government admitted that there might be a link between BSE and a deadly human variant of the disease, public confidence had plummeted dramatically. There were no countervailing powers at the European level because British authorities had staffed scientific committees in the European Union with their own "experts." In the meantime, the institutional landscape has been changing across Europe. Thus, the EU is establishing its own European Food Authority (EFA). Also, the British government has been dismantling the old Ministry of Agriculture while setting up a new Food Standards Agency (FSA). Still, an examination of the politics surrounding the BSE issue in Europe reveals striking differences when compared to the situation in the U. S. First, government agencies are not under public scrutiny the way American agencies are. A culture of public interest groups serving as watchdogs is still lacking, as too are the opportunities to challenge public agencies in courts. Since the Green parties in Europe often join the government, they cannot exercise this role. Nevertheless, both Germany and the UK are about to enact laws that resemble the U. S. Freedom of Information Act, allowing the public closer scrutiny of government agencies.

Second, it is difficult to achieve a sound scientific approach at the European level. Advisory committees in Brussels tend to reflect the approaches of their national governments, thereby opening the backdoor for lobbyists and lobbying activity by member states. Such committees are more appropriate in the intergovernmental realm than in the integrated realm of the European Union. The goal of establishing a new agency in Europe is to change this situation. One could argue that a sound scientific approach would assure that scientific decisions do not get mixed up with politics. Though it has been widely shown that European citizens trust in science less than Americans, it is not clear whether they distrust science in general or whether they disapprove of the way governments handle science. As for the mad cow crisis, sound scientific practice would have meant that competing scientific opinions had to be taken into account. Sound science is not about a definite solution; it is about proposing alternative assessments on the basis of science.

	The composition of livestock feed may play a part in the absence of BSE in American herds

Third, risk assessment and risk management will remain separate procedures, because the European Commission and other governing institutions insist that powers be divided. This holds true as well for most of the member states of the European Union. In the end, therefore, the EFA will not resemble the FDA with its combined powers of rule making, law enforcement and juridical competencies. Such a separation of powers may ultimately weaken a comprehensive approach toward food safety.

Fourth, in this crisis the centralized style of the British government did not serve the interests of consumers, or even the interests of farmers and businesses. High level government officials exercised almost complete control over science, which would not have been possible in a more fragmented system. Conventional wisdom holds that centralized governments do better when they deal with general risks. But this assumption has to be called into question. As far as the input into the political process is concerned, the involvement of interest groups and constituencies together with a process of public debate work better if there is a competitive and publicly scrutinized structure of government. Risks inherent in interest groups and the politics of secrecy will be counterbalanced if there is, as in the United States, a reliable decentralized system. Regardless of its own shortcomings, such a system may be the one preferred over a centralized system of government when particular policies like food safety are at stake.